

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Since the middle of the twentieth century, Western Europe has been faced with growing migration flows. Social research has focused on the first generation of international migrants, the interplay between international migration and the family dynamics of migrants, however, has not been fully understood.

International migration is associated with a rapid change in the migrants' environment. This change usually takes place within a much shorter time span than societies alter as a whole. Immigrants have to cope with these changes. Therefore, the study of the demographic behavior of migrants enables us to gain insights into the patterns and speed of the demographic responses of individuals or groups to sudden environmental alterations to which they are exposed (Coleman 1994). The life-course approach (e.g., Mulder 1993; Mulder and Wagner 1993) allows us to analyze the sequencing of several events, and therefore to study the short-term as well as the long-term effects of migration on a person's life. Studies show, for example, that international migration often coincides with downward social mobility for the migrants in terms of occupation, income, housing conditions, etc. (Constant and Massey 2005). Internal or international migration and partner selection are frequently interrelated processes (Mulder 1993; Milewski 2003; Straßburger 2003; Kulu 2006), and international migration and repeated moves have an impact on the subsequent stability of a union (Roloff 1998; Boyle et al. 2008).

When it comes to fertility, the impact of migration is discussed based on competing hypotheses that aim to address the following questions: Does the act of migration, and its related cultural and socio-economic consequences, have a depressing or a stimulating effect on childbearing behavior? Do migrants continue to display the behavior of their old environment, or adopt behavior typical of the new environment? And what are the mechanisms behind the respective behaviors?

Moreover, the population of descendants of international migrants is growing in European destination countries. The second immigrant generation consists of persons who moved with their immigrant parents to another country when they were children, and of persons born in a country of destination to one or two immigrant parents. Second-generation immigrants have reached family-formation

ages; a third generation is developing. Portes and Zhou (1993, p. 75) emphasize that “Growing up in an immigrant family has always been difficult, as individuals are torn by conflicting social and cultural demands, while they face the challenge of entry into an unfamiliar and frequently hostile world.” Hence, research should consider a comparison between the immigrant generations: Does the behavior of the immigrants’ children resemble that of their parents, or that of the population at destination?

The objective of this doctoral thesis is to investigate the transition to motherhood of immigrants and of their children’s generation in West Germany, as well as the transitions to second and third births. A comparison is drawn between women of the first and second immigrant generations of traditional labor migrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavian states, Greece, Italy, and Spain; and their behavior is compared with that of West German women. The study contributes to the theoretical framework of short-term and long-term impacts of migration on the fertility of immigrants, compared with that of citizens of the country of destination who have no immigration background. It also aims to broaden the understanding of population behavior and changes in behavior in Germany and in Western Europe in general, since labor migration to West Germany parallels trends in other Western European countries.

The present chapter begins with an overview of Germany’s immigration history after 1945. It subsequently gives a summary of research carried out on fertility of immigrants in Germany, and finally contains an overview of this book.

## 1.1 Germany’s Immigration History After 1945

Germany<sup>1</sup> has been one of the main countries of destination in Europe (Fassmann and Münz 1994), despite the fact that politicians have long refused to acknowledge West Germany as an immigration country (Höhn 1979; Ronge 1997). Three main types of international migration can be distinguished: labor immigration, the immigration of ethnic Germans, and the immigration of non-German refugees and asylum seekers (e.g., Jones and Wild 1992; Fassmann and Münz 1994; Rudolph 2002).<sup>2</sup> While some types of immigrants were expected to stay only temporarily in

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<sup>1</sup>In this chapter, “Germany” refers to the Federal Republic of Germany as it has been existing since October 3, 1990. “West Germany” refers to the pre- and post-unified former FRG, including West Berlin. “East Germany” refers to the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) before October 3, 1990, and to the new federal states of the FRG since this date.

<sup>2</sup>The following avenues have existed for foreigners to move legally to Germany since 1973 (Münz et al. 1997a): (1) liberality and freedom of movement for citizens of the member states of the European Union (EU, since 1994) and the European Economic Area (EEA); (2) legal working opportunities for citizens of non-EU states, such as contract workers, seasonal workers, and “guest workers”; (3) right of family reunification for foreign spouses and children up to age 16 of

Germany, as in the case of migrant workers, other types of immigrants were expected to stay permanently, as in the case of ethnic Germans. In fact, immigrants who were expected to remain only temporarily have shown an increasing tendency to make Germany their home base.

From 1954 to the end of the twentieth century, a total of 31 million Germans and foreigners moved to Germany. About 22 million persons left Germany. As a consequence, the net immigration has been about 200,000 persons per year (Zuwanderungskommission 2001). At the turn of the century, Germany had about 82 million inhabitants, of which about 10% were of foreign nationality. The share of persons born abroad of the total foreign population was six million (81%). Meanwhile, 1.4 million foreign nationals were born to foreigners in Germany (Münz and Ulrich 2000). However, the number of persons with an immigration background is, in fact, much higher, because the increasing number of naturalizations hides the immigration backgrounds of many German residents.

### ***1.1.1 Expellees (Vertriebene) and In-Migrating Ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)***

From medieval times until the end of the nineteenth century, Germans emigrated to almost all countries in East Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe for work or for other reasons. The emigrants formed German minorities in those areas of destination. As a consequence of the nascent nationalist ideology in the middle of the nineteenth century, and, later, the two world wars, members of the German minorities faced various forms of persecution, including restrictions in their living conditions, forced assimilation, expropriation, forced resettlement, and deportation. Whereas before 1939 about 8.6 million ethnic Germans lived outside of the borders of the *Deutsche Reich*, and while another nine million Germans lived in the so-called German East provinces (Silesia, East Brandenburg, Pomerania, and East Prussia), the ethnic-German population living in those areas was reduced to about four million by 1960 (Ronge 1997; Heinen 2000a; von Engelhardt 2002).

The ethnic Germans who were forced to return to Germany immediately during or following the Second World War are normally called designated *Vertriebene* (expellees). They had lived mainly in the former German East provinces

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foreigners living in Germany; (4) application for asylum for politically persecuted persons and their closest relatives; (5) special agreements for so-called contingent refugees; (6) temporary toleration of war victims and expellees (since 1993); (7) exceptions for managers of international companies, military staff of allied countries, employees of international organizations, diplomats, correspondents of foreign media, artists, and foreign students. The latter groups are only a small share of the foreign population, however, and their stay in Germany is intended to be temporary (Glebe 1997). Illegal immigrants are not considered here (so far, there are hardly any studies of the demographic behavior of illegal immigrants in Germany; Lederer 1999; Fleischer 2007).

(see above), as well as in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. This designation applied to about twelve million ethnic Germans in total who moved to Germany from 1945 to 1949 (Bade 1994). Almost eight million of these refugees and ethnic Germans were resettled in western Germany, mainly in the American and British sectors, while another 3.6 million were given new homes in the Soviet sector, and about 530,000 persons were resettled in Austria (Fassmann and Münz 1994; Münz 1997; von Engelhardt 2002).

The emigration of ethnic Germans from the former German East provinces and the other countries with German minorities continued during the time of the Cold War, albeit at a relatively low level. Ethnic German immigrants who moved to Germany during this period are called *Aussiedler* (Bade 1994).<sup>3</sup>

While 1.3 million persons moved to West Germany from 1950 to 1985, the end of the political East-West confrontation led to a huge increase in the numbers of emigrating *Aussiedler*. Their main countries of origin are Poland, the countries of the former Soviet Union (mainly Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Central Asian states), and Romania (Jones and Wild 1992; Klüter 1993; Dietz 2000; Gabanyi 2000; Rogall 2000). Throughout the decades, immigration from Poland to West Germany was consistently dominant. However, over time a shift eastwards in the countries of origin is discernible. Most of the repatriates from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia entered West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. Immigration from the former Soviet Union increased only with the 1970s. Also, immigration from Romania did not start to increase until 1967 (when a full diplomatic relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and Romania was established), and it accelerated from 1978 onwards (Jones and Wild 1992; Ronge 1997). The number of ethnic Germans likely to immigrate to Germany in the future is estimated to be about 350,000 persons for Poland, 50,000 for Romania, and 800,000 for the former Soviet Union (Fuchs 1999).

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<sup>3</sup>The emigration of ethnic Germans during the years after 1949 was of a more voluntary character than the expulsions were from 1945 to 1949. In the later years, the emigration took place only after a request for it. Hence, the different titles – expellees from 1945 to 1949, *Aussiedler* (1950 to 1992), and *Spätaussiedler* (since 1993) – are reasonable (Münz et al. 1997a) and refer to changes in the German law as well (Heller et al. 2002). The majority of the ethnic Germans who were not of German citizenship – about eight million persons – immigrated to Germany as refugees and expellees until 1949. In order to facilitate integration in terms of nationality, the term *Statusdeutscher* (refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin) was introduced into the constitutional Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (*Grundgesetz*, Article 116, Paragraph 1). The *Staatsangehörigkeitsregelungsgesetz* contains a right of those persons to obtain German nationality. Those persons have to meet certain criteria, which are described in the *Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz*. After the expulsions connected to the Second World War, ethnic Germans could not leave their countries of origin freely anymore, but could freely enter West Germany. They could apply for German citizenship there, even when they were on a holiday trip or after illegally crossing the German border. This practice was changed in the *Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz*. Since July 1, 1990, ethnic Germans have to apply for entry into Germany in the respective country of origin. The *Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz* of 1992 restricts the yearly number of accepted ethnic Germans. It also prescribes that only persons born before January 1, 1993 are allowed to apply for German citizenship (Münz et al. 1997a; Dietz 2000; Heller et al. 2002).

Ethnic Germans tend to migrate as families, with the majority of new arrivals being between the ages of 18 and 65, but many immigrant families also travel with children or elderly relatives (Harmsen 1983). From 1949 through today, about five million ethnic Germans have resettled in Germany (Heinen 2000b). In the past, expellees and ethnic Germans have had to undergo a real immigration process involving national identity, language, and cultural framework, although they are not foreigners according to the German Basic Law, and this situation continues to this day. Since they were treated as Germans, *Aussiedler* have the right of naturalization (Bade 1994). Therefore, in official statistics on foreigners, expellees and ethnic Germans are either not listed at all, or have not been listed over a longer period. This practice does not make it easy to obtain information about the demographic characteristics of ethnic German immigrants (Heinen 2000b).<sup>4</sup>

### 1.1.2 “Guest Workers” (*Gastarbeiter*) in West Germany

The economy in West Germany started flourishing in the 1950s. The demand for workers increased strongly. At the beginning of this period, called the *Wirtschaftswunder*, immigrants from East Germany could satisfy this need (Destatis 1997). Some 3.5 million persons moved from East to West Germany between the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), both in 1949, and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 (Münz 1997). Nevertheless, a large number of jobs could not be filled in West Germany in the 1950s.

As early as at the beginning of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, West Germany began recruitment activities in Southern Europe. Its first so-called “guest-worker”<sup>5</sup> treaty was signed with Italy in 1955. Treaties followed with Spain in 1960, Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968. Whereas half of the immigrant workers came from Italy in 1960, Greece and Spain took over as the leading countries of origin 4 years later, and then Turkey dominated at the end of the 1960s. “Guest workers” received a work and residence permit for 1 year. This implied a rotation of the recruited workers. Accordingly, the number of both immigrants and emigrants was high until the early 1970s. Starting as early as in 1964 already (for Turkey), the rule of forced rotation was changed gradually to allow workers to apply for permits to stay for 2 years, and, later, for 5 additional years if a worker had been employed for 5 years. However, the rotation model failed – on the immigrants’ side because the

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<sup>4</sup>For the education and labor-force participation of ethnic Germans see Jones and Wild (1992), Kreyenfeld and Konietzka (2002); for religious affiliation see Jones and Wild (1992); for regional distribution in Germany see Jones and Wild (1992); for social networks and living conditions see Bauer and Zimmermann (1997), Bürkner (1998), Dietz (2000), Heller et al. (2002).

<sup>5</sup>The term “guest worker” is used here to refer to this group of migrant workers defined by specific conditions during a specific phase.

workers tended to stay in West Germany for a longer time than anticipated, and on the employers' side because the training costs for new workers were regarded as too high (Münz and Ulrich 2000; Rudolph 2002).

It was not until the recession of 1966 and 1967 that the number of foreign workers employed sank sharply, but the number increased again during the subsequent economic recovery. "Industrial jobs which only required minimal qualifications and a high risk of unemployment had become the domain of foreign employment" (Seifert 1997, p. 3). "Guest workers" were also employed in the building trade and in the service sector, primarily in the restaurant and hotel industries. Throughout the 1960s, temporary "guest workers" were characterized by the following: they frequently accepted the hardest working conditions in the market in order to receive a wage level as high as possible; they restrained their consumption in order to send remittances to their country of origin; and, since living costs in the country of destination were relatively high, they were nearly all single males between the ages of 20 to 40, and not whole families.

The year 1973 marked a turning point in the "guest-worker" policies of West Germany, as well as of other Western European countries. A recruitment ban was put into force because of the recession resulting from the OPEC oil embargo and the oil crisis. West Germany supported the return of migrant workers to their country of origin by financial means. This applied to "guest workers" from non-member states of the European Community (EC). Persons stemming from the member states of the European Union (EU) and its predecessor, the EC, have had freedom of movement since its foundation in 1957; this applies in the main to workers from Italy, Greece, and Spain (CoE 1984; Herrmann 1992b; Meis 1993; Wendt 1993; Bade 1994; Münz 1997; Seifert 1997; Bauer 1998; Münz and Ulrich 2000; Rudolph 2002).

Mainly as a reaction to the end of recruitment, "guest workers" made West Germany their primary residence and brought their families to live in West Germany. Family reunification was, and still is, possible even after the recruitment ban. It includes spouses and children of persons residing in Germany. Half of the total immigration to West Germany during the 1970s and 1980s consisted of family members. The residency of the immigrant workers became increasingly permanent. Moves were made easier because "guest workers" had been building up social networks consisting of families, associations, and religious communities. A stable immigrant population was being formed (Bade 1994).

Up to today, the majority of the foreign population lives in the western part of Germany. Among all foreigners, only about one in ten lives in East Germany and Berlin; the share of foreigners is currently less than 3% of the total population in each of the five eastern *Bundesländer* (Destatis 2005). The biggest groups of immigrants from non-EU countries living in today's Germany are from Turkey, as well as from the former Yugoslavia and its successor states (Migrationsbericht 2003). Through an increase in the length of stay, the structure of the foreign population started to resemble that of the host society with respect to sex ratio, age structure, and labor-force participation (Bürkner et al. 1987).

On the one hand, immigrant workers may be better off in economic terms in West Germany than they would have been in their countries of origin. Turkish

workers, for example, mainly came from areas that did not provide satisfactory job opportunities. "Thus the distribution of Turkish workers in Federal Germany ... represents the whole process of the migratory chain, starting with the economically depressed village dwellers, who, rather than moving to larger cities first, make the leap by joining their relatives or countrymen abroad" (Abadan-Unat 1974, p. 368/369). On the other hand, a comparison between the foreign population in West Germany and Germans shows that immigrants have a lower socio-economic status than West Germans; a similar socio-economic disparity between persons of the receiving country and international migrants is also observed in other countries of destination (Fassmann 1997; Constant and Massey 2005). This includes educational attainment, in the sense that the highest educational qualification achieved by immigrants is, on average, lower than that of persons of the destination country, or that immigrants cannot utilize their education to the fullest in the labor market. This disadvantage among immigrants also continues in their children's generation. Yet, in general, a trend towards higher education is discernible among younger cohorts in recent years (Seifert 1997; Fritzsche 2000; Konietzka and Seibert 2003).

The number of foreigners participating in the labor force decreased from 2.6 million in 1972, to about 1.7 million in 1978 (Münscher 1979; Wendt 1993; Bade 1994; Zuwanderungskommission 2001). Whereas the unemployment rate was lower among foreigners in Germany than it was among the German population until 1973 (0.8% compared to 1.3% in 1973), the unemployment rate of immigrants increased because of the economic crises in the mid-1970s. Since then, it has been higher than the unemployment rate among Germans (Bürkner et al. 1987).

In line with the trend towards making Germany their primary place of residence, the length of stay of the foreign workers increased. In 1980, almost 40% of the immigrant population had been living in Germany for longer than 10 years. In 1991, about 30% of the immigrants had been living in Germany for 10 to 20 years, and 26% had been resident in the country for more than 20 years (Bade 1994).<sup>6</sup> Waldorf (1995) shows that the probability of return-migration intentions among "guest workers" from Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia decreased as satisfaction with their jobs and residences increased.

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<sup>6</sup>The structure of the immigration of workers has been changing since the 1980s. Immigrants of a high social and occupational status also came to Germany. However, their numbers ranged from between fewer than 5,000 Japanese and up to 20,000 U.S. Americans per year (Glebe 1997). Inter-regional migration of highly qualified people has become common within EU countries, as has the migration of retired persons (Poulain 1996). A new form of worker immigration has been emerging since 2000: the recruitment of highly qualified IT specialists from non-EU countries. The contingent with a combined 5-year permit for residence and work is 20,000. In the first 3 years after the new permit was established, about 10,600 persons received such a "Green Card," which is a small number compared to the number of the "historic guest workers" (Pethe 2004).

### 1.1.3 Foreign Workers (*Vertragsarbeiter*) in the Former GDR

The former GDR also recruited workers from foreign countries. The number of contract workers (*Vertragsarbeiter*) never reached the volume of “guest workers” in West Germany, and the number of persons of foreign nationality currently living in East Germany is only a small share of the total number of immigrants in Germany.

The GDR signed its first contract-worker treaty with Poland in 1966, followed by treaties with Hungary in 1967 and 1973, with Algeria in 1974, with Cuba in 1987, with Mozambique in 1979, with Vietnam in 1980, with Angola in 1984, and with China in 1986 (Herrmann 1992b). A total of about 80,000 workers from “Third World” countries, as these nations were called at that time, were allowed to work in the GDR (Dorbritz and Speigner 1990). Their contracts were limited to 3–5 years. The contract workers lived in company-owned hostels or community flats. The government strongly discouraged and policed any contacts between foreign contract workers and GDR citizens. The media were forbidden to report on contract workers and on the numbers of foreigners living in the GDR (Herrmann 1992b). Although GDR propaganda derided the “foreign-workers policies of the imperialists” and the “inhuman capitalist exploitation in West Germany,” the foreign workers in the GDR faced worse social and economic conditions than their counterparts in West Germany (Bade 1994, p. 52). Instead of integration, exclusion was intended. Bade (1994, p. 52) calls the GDR policy a “prescribed creation of a ghetto.”

Similar to “guest workers” in West Germany, contract workers in the GDR were employed in the least desirable occupational fields in the primary production areas, mainly in the textile industry, motor-manufacturing industry, and in the production of synthetic fibers and tires. The employment contracts were strictly temporary. After their contract had expired, the workers were required to leave the GDR immediately. Foreigners had to pay all the obligatory social-security contributions, but they were not entitled to receive social benefits. According to the governmental treaties, the respective countries of origin directly received a share of the contract workers’ income. The restrictions given in the contracts even included a procedure in case of pregnancy: the contract between East Berlin and Hanoi from 1987 mandated that a pregnant Vietnamese woman would have to have an abortion; otherwise she would immediately be expelled from the GDR (these kinds of contracts were similar to those that regulated the recruitment and employment of foreign seasonal workers at agricultural farms in the areas from East of the Elbe before the First World War (Herrmann 1992b; Bade 1994)).

With the end of the GDR, the contract workers had to leave Germany. At the end of 1989, 191,200 foreigners were registered in the GDR. Among them, about 80% came from five countries: Vietnam (the largest group with about 60,000 persons), Mozambique (about 15,000), Poland, Hungary, and the former Soviet Union. The share of foreigners of the total population was 1.2%. Some 70% of the foreign population participated in the labor force, while only 6% were young persons

under age 18. The share of women among the foreign population was about 30% (Herrmann 1992a; Bade 1994). Within less than 2 years, the number of remaining contract workers dropped to less than 4%; or 6,670 as of June 30, 1991. This was due to the expiration of the government treaties, and to offers of financial support for workers who returned home before their contracts expired (Herrmann 1992a, b).

### ***1.1.4 Refugees and Asylum Seekers***

The numbers of refugees and asylum seekers<sup>7</sup> have been increasing in almost all Western European countries since the mid-1980s. The refugees and asylum seekers come mainly from the former Yugoslavia and from developing countries. In practice there are many different definitions of what constitutes a refugee. There are, for example, refugees under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as refugees fleeing poverty or environmental disasters. A high proportion of refugees do not remain in the countries of destination. The number of refugees exceeds that of asylum seekers. In 1992, for example, about 1.5 million refugees lived in Germany, among them over 300,000 persons from the former Yugoslavia (Bade 1994; Münz 1997).

The number of asylum seekers was, on average, 7,000 persons per year until the beginning of the 1970s. After the increase in the 1980s, asylum seekers made up around 20% of the total immigration to Germany. The number of asylum seekers reached a peak of 438,000 in 1992 (Destatis 1997; Zuwanderungskommission 2001; Wendt 2003). The numbers fell after the criteria used in evaluating asylum cases were changed. The right to asylum right has been restricted since 1992, when the government started using concrete measures in order to deport refugees from Germany (Münz 1997). The number of accepted asylum seekers decreased in parallel with the number of applicants. In total, 10% of asylum seekers were accepted in 1995, and this was the average acceptance rate of asylum seekers throughout the 1990s. Hence, 90% of asylum seekers stay only temporarily in Germany. The number of persons granted asylum in Germany was 158,800 in 1995 (Destatis 1997; Wendt 2003).

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<sup>7</sup>People who are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political conviction in their home country are entitled to asylum. If persons are granted asylum, they receive a residence permit (*Aufenthaltsrecht*) and a work permit (Bade 1994). Asylum seekers have to apply for asylum. This procedure can last up to several years. During the first 3 years after the arrival in Germany, a general work ban did not allow asylum seekers to work there (from January 1, 1997 onwards). This time span was shortened to 12 months on January 1, 2001. Accordingly, after a 1-year stay asylum seekers receive a work permit for jobs which cannot be filled by a German or an EU citizen (Angenendt 2002).

### 1.1.5 Summary: Immigrants and Their Descendants in Germany

About 10% of the population in Germany are of foreign nationality. Their main countries of origin are: Turkey (1.9 million), Italy (601,000), Greece (355,000), the states formerly belonging to Yugoslavia (1.04 million), and Poland (327,000) (Münz and Ulrich 2000; Migrationsbericht 2003; Destatis 2005).

The foreign population is not evenly distributed over the federal states (see Table 1.1). Only about 1% of foreign families with children live in the new *Bundesländer* and East Berlin. Among all foreigners, 3.8% live in East Germany and East Berlin (Roloff 1997; Roloff 1999; Destatis 2005). Conurbations with a high share of industry and a specialized service sector have the highest share of foreigners (Münz et al. 1997a, p. 59).

Due to the character of international migration, the socio-demographic structure of the immigrant population in any country is different from that of the population at destination. In Germany, the immigrant population consists of 65% men, whereas the share of men in the German population is only 48%. The male surplus results from the immigrant populations of “guest workers” and asylum seekers. The numbers of immigrant women have increased only since the 1970s (Proebsting 1984; Münz and Ulrich 2000). The sex ratio varies over time and by sub-group (Gröner 1976; CoE 1984; Meis 1993). Moreover, the age structure of the immigrant population is different from that of the German population. Since mainly young adults move to Germany and since the number of children has been higher among immigrants, the share of foreigners is high primarily in the age groups from 16 to 25 years (13 to 17%) (Münz and Ulrich 2000).

**Table 1.1** Regional distribution of foreigners in Germany by federal state, 2005

Federal state	Population Total	Foreign population	
		Total	Share in %
Baden-Württemberg	10,717,419	1,281,717	12.0
Bayern	12,443,893	1,175,198	9.4
Berlin	3,387,828	454,545	13.4
Brandenburg	2,567,704	67,222	2.6
Bremen	663,213	84,610	12.8
Hamburg	1,734,830	244,401	14.1
Hessen	6,097,765	694,693	11.4
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	1,719,653	39,417	2.3
Niedersachsen	8,000,909	536,393	6.7
Nordrhein-Westfalen	18,075,352	1,944,556	10.8
Rheinland-Pfalz	4,061,105	311,556	7.7
Saarland	1,056,417	88,925	8.4
Sachsen	4,296,284	118,480	2.8
Sachsen-Anhalt	2,494,437	47,123	1.9
Schleswig-Holstein	2,828,760	151,286	5.3
Thüringen	2,355,280	47,817	2.0
<i>Germany</i>	82,500,849	7,287,939	8.0

Source: Destatis 2005

Religious affiliation is registered by the Federal Statistical Office only for persons belonging to the Lutheran Church, the Catholic Church, or the Jewish community. Both the Lutheran and the Catholic churches have about 26.5 million members, while around 102,000 people are recorded as Jewish community (Destatis 2004). The number of Muslims has been growing steadily with the number of immigrants. Since the Muslim communities have not received the status of a *Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*, their members are not registered in the statistics of the *Einwohnermeldeamt*. According to the census of 1987, 1.7 million Muslims lived in West Germany, making up 2.7% of the total population. The vast majority of the Muslim community are of foreign origin; only 3% are Germans (FES 2000). According to more recent estimates, the number of Muslims living in Germany could be as high as 3 million. In addition to the two big Christian churches, around 50 other Christian communities exist in Germany. There are also about 250,000 Buddhists and 97,000 Hindus in Germany (Zuwanderungskommission 2001; REMID 2005).

The employment rates among the foreign population in Germany reflect the several waves of immigration. At the beginning of the 1970s, the share of employed foreigners was very high, especially because mainly men came to Germany. Later, when more women immigrated to Germany due to family reunions, the employment rates of foreigners sank, and unemployment rates rose to levels above those of Germans (Höhn et al. 1990; Mammey 1990; Bender and Seifert 2000; Hillmann 2000; see Table 1.2).

**Table 1.2** Employment rates of German and foreign persons by sex, age, and marital status, 1997 – %

Age in years	Germans		Foreigners	
	Total	Non-married	Total	Non-married
<i>Men</i>				
15–19	35.4	35.3	31.8	31.0
20–24	77.6	76.9	75.9	70.6
25–29	87.8	84.5	85.8	76.8
30–34	96.3	94.0	89.8	84.1
35–39	97.2	93.8	91.0	90.6
40–44	96.9	92.2	93.1	87.3
45–49	95.8	89.4	93.4	96.4
50–54	91.9	83.7	86.8	84.6
55–59	78.3	70.4	75.9	84.2
<i>Women</i>				
15–19	28.0	27.8	26.0	25.4
20–24	70.8	71.7	52.9	65.3
25–29	79.5	85.3	50.7	70.3
30–34	77.3	90.6	50.5	73.3
35–39	78.1	92.2	56.5	82.4
40–44	81.1	91.8	59.9	82.4
45–49	78.8	88.7	62.5	82.1
50–54	71.0	83.6	53.6	88.6
55–59	55.3	70.8	46.6	(too few N)

Source: Bender and Seifert (2000, p. 68; data of the Federal Statistical Office)

International migration often coincides with a downward trend in employment status and social class, relative to the prevailing employment rates and social conditions of the country of origin and of the host society (Höhn 1979; Fassmann 1997; Glebe 1997; Neels 2000; Constant and Massey 2005). This applies to the several groups of immigrants and immigrant generations, and it can also be observed with respect to educational attainment. Immigrants' educational qualifications are, on average, lower than those of persons of the destination country. Moreover, immigrants may be unable to utilize their formal education in an adequate manner. These disadvantages also continue in the immigrant children's generation. Compared to West Germans, foreign nationals tend to have lower educational attainment; a higher share has not completed any school degree. This applies to persons both of the first and second immigrant generations, although a trend towards higher education became visible among younger cohorts in recent years (Bonacker and Häufele 1986; Buttler and Dietz 1990; Seifert 1997; Greif et al. 1999; Thränhardt 1999; Fritzsche 2000; Diehl 2002a; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2002; Diefenbach 2003; Konietzka and Seibert 2003). Correspondingly, the economic situation is worse for foreigners than it is for Germans (Jones and Wild 1992; Seifert 1997; Fuchs 1999; Roloff 1999; Schulz 1999). Nevertheless, it seems that socio-economic conditions tend to improve among immigrants as the length of stay increases (Münz et al. 1997b; Büchel and Frick 2005).

Foreign and German couples show differences in their labor-force participation rates: while both partners are active in the labor market in about 40% of foreign marriages, over 60% of German marriages are two-earner couples. The share of couples with children in which either one of the spouses is unemployed is 22% among foreign marriages, and 7% among German couples (Rupp 1980; Roloff 1997, 1999). According to Hillmann (2000), 12% of foreign women have stated that the reason they are not employed is because their parents or husband do not want them to work. Compared to the 1980s, the lack of a work permit is, however, of decreasing importance. Women from the former Yugoslavia are an exception – 11 out of 100 unemployed women cannot work because they do not have a work permit.

## 1.2 Introduction to Fertility of Immigrants in Germany

Whereas research on immigrants in West Germany has mainly focused on issues of integration, such as education and employment, the family situations of immigrants have received less attention. The topic has not been neglected, but current research shows several weak points. For years, a missing link between results and theory has been deplored (Kane 1986; Vaskovics 1987). In the literature, there has been an assumption that international migration affects each dimension in the family life of a person (Nauck 1985). However, the awareness of this has led to an emphasis on the differences that result in particular from cultural differences between immigrants and Germans. In the literature attention has tended to be paid to exotic and

unusual behavior. This has produced a “*Folklore des Halbwissens*” (folklore of half knowledge, BMFSFJ 2000, p. 75; cf. Beck-Gernsheim 2006). Thus certain groups, particularly the ones that seem to be more different from Germans than others, have more often been the object of study than others.


Specifically, the family formation of immigrants – union formation and the transition to parenthood and to subsequent births – has not received much attention for some time (Vaskovics 1987), and “no attempt has been made to analyze the longer trends in guest worker fertility or to link migrant fertility to selectivity or assimilation” (Kane 1986, p. 103).

Due to the characteristics of the various immigration waves, many family events among the first generation of immigrants took place before the migration, and not in Germany. In the 1960s, only about 5% of newborn children in Germany were of non-German nationality. But, by the end of the twentieth century, about 100,000 newborn babies per year were of foreign nationality, representing about 13% of all newborns, with a peak of 17% in 1974. The increase in the share of foreign births of the total number of births is related not only to a slight increase in the number of foreign births, but also to the decline in West German births. The family patterns of immigrants and West Germans differ in a few aspects. The level of childlessness among West German women is as high as 20%, and is higher than among the various immigrant groups. The West Germans’ mean age at first birth has increased steadily from 23.7 for the 1945 birth cohort, to 25.4 for the cohort of 1958, and is higher than that of immigrants. There is a dominance of the two-child family among West German married couples, whereas immigrants from Turkey more often have three and more children (Vaskovics 1987; Schwarz 1996; Roloff 1997; BMFSFJ 2000; Kreyenfeld 2001a).

Marriage is the main partnership type for West German women as well as for immigrant women in West Germany. It is also the most important factor for childbirth, both for West Germans and for immigrants. About 85% of married couples in both groups have children (Carlson 1985b; Schwarz 1996). Compared to the levels in the respective countries of origin, the share of non-marital births among the total number of births of immigrant women in West Germany is much higher, however, and reaches levels similar to those of West Germans (about 10% since the 1980s; Schwarz 1996) (Fig. 1.1).

As far as further determinants of fertility are concerned, the few studies carried out so far show that the behavior of immigrants is affected in a manner similar to the behavior of West Germans. Women who have completed secondary education have lower fertility than women with lower educational attainment. People without religious affiliation have fewer children than women who are members of a religious group, and women who originally come from rural areas have higher fertility than women from cities. In general, fertility declined towards the end of the twentieth century (Kane 1986, 1989; Mayer and Riphahn 2000).

Ethnic German immigrants and their children are not recognizable in the statistics as immigrants because of naturalization. This makes it rather difficult to conduct research on this group (Dinkel and Lebok [1997] studied childbearing among ethnic Germans after the move to Germany; they found low birth rates after



**Fig. 1.1** Number of births in Germany, 1960–1997

migration and concluded that the move almost completes the process of family formation). The same applies to asylum seekers as soon as asylum and German nationality are granted, and to other immigrants who have gained German citizenship. It is not possible to distinguish between immigrants and their children, either, when only nationality is registered. As far as migrant workers are concerned, this was not an issue during the first decades of immigration, since a second generation did not exist.

As we have seen, the character of immigration to Germany has been changing. Primary family reunion – i.e., marriage migration – and the migration of single persons has increased as a share of total immigration in Germany, as it also has in other Western European countries. At the same time, the number of mixed marriages increased. The number of marriages of a German national to a non-German citizen almost tripled during the last three decades of the twentieth century (Roloff 1998). Official statistics underestimate the numbers of foreign marriages, though (Straßburger 2000).

The family formation of first-generation immigrants increasingly takes place in Germany, a second generation of immigrants has reached family-formation ages, and a third generation is emerging. Research on fertility of immigrants in Germany has, however, not sufficiently responded to these developments. Most of the studies use nationality as an indicator for classifying someone as an immigrant. Due to naturalization, this may not cover all births of the immigrant population, however. Only few studies distinguish between migrant generations (Milewski 2003; Straßburger 2003; González-Ferrer 2006 on partner selection). Although there is a notion that it is not necessarily cultural differences between the country of origin and the country of destination that have an impact on demographic behavior, but rather the migration process itself and its order in the sequence of life events, not many studies take the duration of stay into account (Hennig and Kohlmann 1999;

Mayer and Riphahn 2000 on fertility). All fertility studies use summary measures, such as the Total Fertility Rate or completed fertility, rarely asking about the sequencing of childbearing and migration (as an exception, Nauck [1987] looks at the role that children who remain in the country of origin play in further childbearing).

### **1.3 Research Questions and Structure of the Study**

This doctoral project examines the fertility behavior after migration from one cultural context to another. It addresses the following questions: Does international migration, and its related cultural and socio-economic consequences, have a depressing or a stimulating effect on childbearing behavior? Do immigrants tend to continue to display the behavior of their old environment, or adopt the behavior of the new environment? And what are the mechanisms behind the respective behaviors? Moreover, the study aims at comparing the fertility behaviors of women of the first and the second generations of immigrants, since the population of the second immigrant generation is growing in European receiving countries. The second generation consists of persons who moved with their immigrant parents to another country when they were children on the one hand, and of persons born in a country of destination to one or two immigrant parents on the other.

The theoretical reasoning of the study rests on the life-course approach. According to this perspective, the life of an individual is composed of a series of transitions or life events embedded in trajectories or careers that give them distinct form and meaning (Elder 1985). Information on individual-level life histories enables the researcher to link demographic events in the life domain of an individual to past events in the same domain, to changes in other life domains (“parallel careers”), and to changes in the lives of other family members and members of social networks (“linked lives”). This procedure advances significantly our understanding of the causes of demographic behavior. While there is an ample literature that examines how changes in the educational and occupational careers of individuals shape their family behavior, their fertility, and migration patterns, the interactions between partnership careers and childbearing on the one hand and spatial mobility on the other have received little attention until recently (Kulu and Milewski 2007). This project aims to contribute to improving this situation.

The structure of the book is as follows:

The second chapter is dedicated to the theoretical framework that guides the analyses. First, it introduces the main theories and hypotheses that exist regarding the fertility of migrants. This section draws upon studies of both international and internal migrants, since the frameworks have parallels. For the first generation of both groups of migrants, the discussion centers on five hypotheses. These hypotheses are related to timing effects, to the socio-demographic characteristics of migrants, as well as to living conditions and cultural factors. Since the immigrant respondents in this study stem from countries that used to have a tradition of higher

fertility levels than West Germany (even if this has changed in the past two decades), one can generalize that the women under consideration moved from a higher-fertility context to a low-fertility context. Given the fertility differentials between country of origin and country of destination, two outcomes may be hypothesized for the fertility of immigrants: They may have a higher fertility or a lower fertility than that of the population at destination (including a convergence with the fertility levels of persons at destination).

If the socialization of the immigrant women in the country of origin continues to have an impact on the fertility intentions and behavior of a woman, then she would have higher fertility levels after migration even in a country of lower fertility (the *socialization hypothesis*). A second theory that also predicts a fertility stimulating effect draws on an interrelation of events, and assumes that immigration and union formation/marriage are interrelated events. Therefore, fertility may increase after immigration, not due to the move, but due to household formation (the *hypothesis on the interrelation of events*).

Migration may have the effect of decreasing fertility. This may be directly caused by the migration process and its related difficulties (the *disruption hypothesis*), or by the impact of the living circumstances and the societal framework at destination as the duration of stay increases (the *adaptation hypothesis*). Moreover, the selection and composition of the immigrant population can play a role. Similarities or differences in fertility behavior between immigrants and persons of the country of destination may perhaps be traced back to the selectivity of the migrant groups concerning their fertility intentions, which may be more similar to those prevalent in the destination country than to those characteristic of the country of origin. However, immigration may favor certain socio-demographic groups that are amenable to having more children than is typical among the population of the country of destination (or even among the population at origin). Fertility differentials may therefore be explained by compositional differences, and may vanish as the socio-demographic structure of an immigrant group gets to resemble that of the indigenous population at destination (the *hypothesis of selection and characteristics*).

One of the goals of this study is to investigate similarities and differences in the fertility behavior of first- and second-generation immigrants. Since the framework that focuses on the migrants emphasizes the role of the migration process, it is of limited use for a study of the second generation. Therefore, our investigation also draws upon the theoretical framework concerning fertility behavior of minority groups. This can be applied to members of subsequent migrant generations who have not experienced any move themselves, provided they maintain a sub-group behavior that is distinct from that of the majority population. In line with the framework of migration and fertility, both a higher fertility and a lower fertility can be hypothesized for women who belong to a minority group. Causes may include the composition of the group (the *hypothesis of characteristics*), the economic situation, as well as the experience of discrimination and uncertainty (the *hypothesis of the minority status*), and the maintenance of distinct fertility norms (the *hypothesis of a sub-culture*).

The second chapter provides also information on the family-formation contexts of the five countries of origin considered here; these are Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, and Spain – countries that traditionally have provided West Germany and other Western European countries with labor migrants. Since the socio-demographic characteristics of women and their partners play an important role in fertility behavior, the second chapter also provides an overview of the structure of the “guest-worker” population of Turkish, former Yugoslavian, Greek, Italian, and Spanish backgrounds living in West Germany; and of research that has been carried out on their fertility in West Germany so far. The chapter concludes with the working hypotheses guiding the analysis. The main questions are as follows: Are the transition rates to first, second, and third births among immigrant women from migrant-worker countries different from those of West Germans? If so, what is the extent to which fertility differences can be explained by immigrants’ selectivity, duration of stay in Germany, and compositional differences?

The third chapter contains the empirical analyses. It opens with a section on the data, covariates, and methods used. The data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel study (GSOEP), carried out by the German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin. The regional focus is on persons who live in West Germany, because the share of immigrants living in East Germany is very low. The GSOEP data provides retrospective information on women’s birth histories, as well as on immigration and marriage histories. Therefore, the transitions to a first, second, and third birth can be studied from the perspective of the life course by applying event-history analysis.

The study concludes with a discussion of the results and suggestions for further research (Chap. 4).

The contributions of my study to research on fertility of international migrants in Germany can be summarized as follows:

- Distinctions are made between immigrant generations
- Attention is given to the timing/sequencing of different events in an individual’s life course (migration, union formation, childbearing)
- The interplay between different domains in a woman’s life (education, employment) is addressed
- The impact of the partner’s characteristics on a woman’s fertility is considered.